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LIST OF PARTIES
1.

Free Motion Fitness and Icon Health & Fitness. Free Motion and Icon

(collectively "Icon" or the "Icon Parties") are the buyers under an Asset Purchase
Agreement with Ground Zero Design, LLC as seller (the "Asset Purchase Agreement")
and also a party to the Indemnity Escrow Agreement between Icon, Ground Zero and
Wells Fargo.
2.

Ground Zero Design, LLC - Defendant/Appellee. Ground Zero is the

seller under the Asset Purchase Agreement and also a party to the Indemnity Escrow
Agreement.
3.

Wells Fargo Bank West, N.A. - Defendant/Appellee. Wells Fargo is the

escrow agent under the Indemnity Escrow Agreement.
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Wells Fargo Bank West, N.A. ("Wells Fargo"), a defendant and appellee in the
above-captioned case, submits this brief pursuant to Rule 24(b) of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure.
I.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)0) (2001).
II.

STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED FOR APPEAL
AND CORRESPONDING STANDARD OF REVIEW

Appellee, Wells Fargo, disputes Appellants' Statement of Issues numbered A, B,
C, D, E, and F and asserts that each of those statements of issues is a repetitive statement
of the following issue:
Issue No. 1:
Did the trial court err in finding that the Icon Parties' right to the Escrow Funds
was governed by the terms of the Asset Purchase Agreement and that under the terms of
the Asset Purchase Agreement, the August 2001 Certificate did not provide a basis to a
claim to the Escrow Funds?
Appellee, Wells Fargo additionally disputes Appellants' Statement of Issue
numbered G and asserts that this issue is more correctly stated as follows:
Issue No. 2:
Did the trial court err in finding that the July 2003 Certificate was untimely and
therefore could not be the basis for a claim to the Escrow Funds?
vi

III.

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY AUTHORITY

The issues presented on appeal are governed by the contracts entered into by the
parties and by the common law.
IV.
A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case.

In December 2000, Free Motion Fitness and Icon Health & Fitness (collectively
"Icon" or the "Icon Parties") purchased all of the assets of Ground Zero Design, LLC
("Ground Zero") pursuant to a written Asset Purchase Agreement ("Asset Purchase
Agreement"). In the Asset Purchase Agreement, Ground Zero made certain
indemnification obligations in favor of Icon and $400,000 (the "Escrow Funds") of the
purchase price was deposited in escrow with Wells Fargo Bank to partially satisfy
indemnification obligations that may arise during the first year after the purchase under
the Asset Purchase Agreement. In connection with the escrow, Icon, Ground Zero and
Wells Fargo entered into an Indemnity Escrow Agreement (the "Indemnity Escrow
Agreement").
Wells Fargo released these Escrow Funds to Ground Zero one year later in
December 2001. Wells Fargo's release of the Escrow Funds was premature under the
terms of the Indemnity Escrow Agreement. However, under the terms of the Indemnity
Escrow Agreement and the Asset Purchase Agreement, these Escrow Funds would have
ultimately been released to Ground Zero in any event. Therefore, the Icon Parties can
claim no damages from the release of the Escrow Funds.
vii

The Icon Parties sued Wells Fargo claiming entitlement to the Escrow Funds, and
sued Ground Zero claiming an obligation to indemnify the Icon Parties. The Icon Parties
alleged two claims to the Escrow Funds. Neither of the claims made by the Icon Parties
entitles them to receive the Escrow Funds under the terms of the Indemnity Escrow
Agreement. In particular, the Icon Parties' first claim for indemnification from the
Escrow Funds (the August 2001 Certificate) was based on an alleged breach of warranty
by Ground Zero under the terms of the Asset Purchase Agreement. The warranty made
by Ground Zero on which the Icon Parties relied is a warranty that no patents sold by
Ground Zero to the Icon Parties infringe on any other patents. Though Hoist Fitness
asserted that patents held by the Icon Parties infringed a patent held by Hoist Fitness, the
Icon Parties obtained a judgment from the United States District Court declaring that the
Icon Parties' patents do not infringe on the Hoist Patent. Thus, this decree conclusively
establishes that Ground Zero did not breach its warranty of non-infringement, the Icon
Parties have no basis for a claim for indemnification, and the August 2001 Certificate did
not represent a valid claim to the Escrow Funds. The trial court correctly so held, based
on the terms of the Asset Purchase Agreement and Indemnity Escrow Agreement. Now
on appeal, the Icon Parties argue that general case law regarding warranties of title
entitles them to indemnification. However, this new argument fails because it requires
the Court to ignore the express terms of the written contracts which outline the sole bases
for indemnification and claim to the Escrow Funds.
Additionally, the Icon Parties' second claim for indemnification from the Escrow
viii

Funds (the July 2003 Certificate) was untimely under the Indemnity Escrow Agreement.
Under the Indemnity Escrow Agreement, the Escrow Funds were to be released to
Ground Zero in December 2001 if there was no claim for indemnification. As of
February 2003, when the Icon Parties obtained the judgment against Hoist Fitness, no
basis existed for Wells Fargo to hold any Escrow Funds. Also, the Indemnity Escrow
Agreement expired by its terms in December 2001 when the Escrow Funds were
disbursed. For both of those reasons, the July 2003 Certificate was untimely and
ineffective under the Indemnity Escrow Agreement.
Because neither of the claims made by the Icon Parties was a valid claim to the
Escrow Funds, the Icon Parties can claim no damages from the release of the Escrow
Funds, even if Wells Fargo's release of the Escrow Funds was premature, and the trial
court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of Wells Fargo dismissing the Icon
Parties 5 claims.
B.

Course of Proceeding and Disposition of Case in the Trial Court
1.

The Icon Parties filed this action on April 13, 2004. (R. 1-9.)

2.

Defendants Wells Fargo and Ground Zero separately answered the

Complaint. Ground Zero asserted various cross-claims and counterclaims against Icon
and Wells Fargo. Wells Fargo asserted cross-claims against Ground Zero for
indemnification. (R. 76-89, 90-98, 122-132, 324-335.)
3.

On June 2, 2006, the Court held a hearing regarding various

summary judgment motions filed by the parties. At that hearing, the Court granted Wells
ix

Fargo's Motion for Summary Judgment against Icon, and granted Ground Zero's Motion
to Dismiss Wells Fargo's Claim for equitable subordination. (R. 2084-85, 2090-2092,
2096-2102.)
4.

Pursuant to the ruling made at the June 2, 2006 hearing, the Court

entered an Order dated October 31, 2006 regarding Wells Fargo's Motion for Summary
Judgment, dismissing all of Icon's claims against Wells Fargo with prejudice. (R. 20902092.)
5.

The Court entered an Order dated October 18, 2007 regarding

Ground Zero's summary judgment motions, and dismissed with prejudice Icon's claims
against Ground Zero and Wells Fargo's second and third causes of action against Ground
Zero. (R. 2096-2102.)
6.

As a result of these Orders, all of Icon's claims against Wells Fargo

and Ground Zero were dismissed by the trial court. (R. 2096-2102.)
7.

On December 3, 2007, pursuant to a stipulation of the parties, the

Court entered an Order dismissing without prejudice Wells Fargo's remaining claims
against Ground Zero. (R. 2106-2108.)
8.

On December 11, 2007, pursuant to a stipulation of the parties, the

Court entered an Order dismissing without prejudice Ground Zero's remaining claims
against Icon and Wells Fargo. (R. 2113-2117.)
9.

The Icon Parties filed a Notice of Appeal on January 2, 2008. (R.

2118-2120.)
x

C.

Statement of Facts Relevant to Issue Presented on Appeal.

In support of its Motion for Summary Judgment as to the Icon Parties' claims,
Wells Fargo submitted the following statement of undisputed material facts, with
citations to the record, as required by Rules 7(c) and 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
Asset Purchase Agreement
1.

On or about December 19, 2000, Plaintiff Free Motion Fitness Inc. (then

known as Ground Zero Design Corporation) ("Free Motion") and Plaintiff Icon Health &
Fitness ("Icon Health") (Free Motion and Icon Health are referred to collectively as
"Icon" or the "Icon Parties"), as buyers, entered into an Asset Purchase Agreement (the
"Asset Purchase Agreement") with Defendant Ground Zero Design, LLC ("Ground
Zero"), as seller, whereby the Icon Parties would acquire Ground Zero's business. See
Asset Purchase Agreement, a copy of which is attached as Exhibit 1 to the Icon Parties'
Brief of Appellant ("Br. of Appellant"); (R. 2, 743, 757-798)
2.

In the Asset Purchase Agreement, Ground Zero agreed to indemnify the

Icon Parties up to an amount of $2.4 million during the one-year period following closing
and up to the amount of $2 million for any claims made through August 31, 2004. (R. 2,
743-757-798.)
3.

The scope of Ground Zero's promise to indemnify, as set out in § 10.2 of

the Asset Purchase Agreement, included any losses related to "[a]ny breach of the

xi

representations and warranties made in Article 3 of the Asset Purchase Agreement."
(R. 2-3,743,790-791.)
4.

In Article 3 of the Asset Purchase Agreement, Ground Zero made

representations and warranties, including a representation and warranty that:
No Intellectual Property . . . infringes upon any
rights owned or held by any other Person.
(R. 31,743-744,771.)
Indemnity Escrow Agreement
5.

In connection with the Asset Purchase Agreement, the Icon Parties and

Ground Zero entered into an Indemnity Escrow Agreement with Wells Fargo as Escrow
Agent (the "Indemnity Escrow Agreement"). Pursuant to the terms of the Indemnity
Escrow Agreement, Wells Fargo was to hold $400,000.00 of the purchase price (the
"Escrow Funds") for the purpose of partially satisfying indemnity claims made by the
Icon Parties in connection with a breach of the terms of the Asset Purchase Agreement
for the one year period ending December 21, 2001. See Indemnity Escrow Agreement, a
copy of which is attached as Exhibit 2 to the Brief of Appellant. (R. 5, 62-71, 744, 800809.)
The August 2001 Certificate
6.

By letters dated March 16, 2001, the Icon Parties and Ground Zero received

notice that Hoist Fitness Systems, Inc. and/or Randall P. Webber (collectively "Hoist
Fitness") claimed that the Free Motion Cable Cross Device purchased by the Icon Parties
xii

from Ground Zero infringed on a patent (the "Hoist Patent") owned by Hoist Fitness.
(R. 744,812-815.)
7.

On or about August 14, 2001, the Icon Parties delivered to Wells Fargo and

to Ground Zero a Buyer's Certificate (the "August 2001 Certificate") asserting a claim
for indemnification in excess of $400,000.00 based upon the threatened claim made by
Hoist Fitness. (R. 5-6, 744, 817-818.)
8.

In the August 2001 Certificate, the Icon Parties state that they are "entitled

to indemnification under Article 10 of the Asset Purchase Agreement," under the
following circumstances:
(a)
Hoist Fitness Systems, Inc. and/or Randall T. Webber,
in a letter to Mr. Roy Simonson dated March 16, 2001, have made a
claim that the Icon cable cross device, sold by Seller to Buyer,
infringes on the Webber/Hoist Fitness Systems, Inc. patent U.S.
Patent No. 5,800,321. This officer's certificate provides formal
notice to Seller and Escrow Agent of such claim of infringement and
invokes the remedies set forth in the Asset Purchase Agreement
("Asset Purchase Agreement") by and among Seller, Buyer, and
Icon dated as of December 19, 2000, and the Indemnity Escrow
Agreement executed simultaneously therewith. Buyer and Icon have
engaged the firm of Workman, Nydegger & Seeley to represent them
in such proceedings. A complaint seeking a declaratory judgment of
non-infringement and of patent invalidity has been filed by Buyer in
the United States District Court, District of Utah, Central Division,
Civil Action No. 1:01CV0091C.
(b)
Pursuant to Section 3.10(c)(ii) of the Asset Purchase
Agreement, the Seller represented that "no Intellectual Property . . .
infringes upon any rights owned or held by any other Person." In
the event that the Hoist claim of infringement is successfully
prosecuted^ such will render the foregoing Seller representation to
be inaccurate and will subject Seller to the indemnification
obligation of up to $2,400,000 set forth in paragraph 10.2 of the
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Asset Purchase Agreement. Such indemnification obligation
includes any Losses which the Buyer Parties may suffer and, as
defined in the Asset Purchase Agreement, includes attorneys' fees
and costs incurred in defending against any such claim.
See August 2001 Certificate, a copy of which is included in Exhibit 3 to the Brief of
Appellant; (R. 745,817-818.)
The Icon Parties' Declaratory Judgment Action
9.

In response to the letter from Hoist Fitness, the Icon Parties filed a

declaratory judgment action against Hoist in the United States District Court for the
District of Utah (the "Icon Declaratory Judgment Action"). (R. 4, 745, 820-825.)
10.

In the Icon Declaratory Judgment Action, the Icon Parties stated two claims

for relief: (1) a first claim for relief seeking a declaration that the Icon products purchased
from Ground Zero do not infringe any claim of the Hoist Patent; and (2) a second claim
for relief seeking a declaration that the Hoist Patent is invalid. (R. 746, 820-825.)
11.

In response, Hoist filed a counterclaim asserting that the Icon products

infringed the Hoist Patent. (R. 746, 827-843.)
12.

In response to cross-motions for summary judgment in the Icon Declaratory

Judgment Action, the Court entered Orders on January 23, 2003 and February 10, 2003
granting the Icon Parties summary judgment on their first claim for relief and declaring
that the Icon products do not infringe on the Hoist Patent. (R. 746, 845-848, 849-852.)

13.

As a result of the Court's ruling, the Icon Parties then voluntarily dismissed

their second claim for relief in the Icon Declaratory Judgment Action, and on April 11,
2003, the case was closed. (R. 746, 854-856, 858-876.)
Termination of Escrow and Release of Funds
14.

Under the terms of the Indemnity Escrow Agreement, Wells Fargo was to

release the Escrow Funds to Ground Zero on December 20, 2001, unless by that date it
had received notice from the Icon Parties of an indemnity claim. (R. 5, 747, 800-810.)
15.

The Indemnity Escrow Agreement provides that the Indemnity Escrow

Agreement terminates when (a) there are no funds remaining in the Escrow Fund; or
(b) by mutual consent of the parties. (R. 5, 747, 803.)
16.

In December 2001, Wells Fargo released the entire Escrow Fund to Ground

Zero. (R. 6, 747.)
The July 2003 Certificate
17.

After the release of the Escrow Fund and after the Icon Declaratory

Judgment Action was closed, on or about May 5, 2003, Michael A. Grassmueck, as the
receiver for Znetix, Inc., brought an action against the Icon Parties and Ground Zero
seeking to recover approximately $1.3 million advanced to Ground Zero prior to the
Asset Purchase Agreement (the "Znetix Advance"). (R. 4, 747.)
18.

By officer's certificate dated July 16, 2003 (the "July 2003 Certificate"),

the Icon Parties gave notice to Wells Fargo and Ground Zero of a second claim for
indemnification pursuant to the Indemnity Escrow Agreement and the Asset Purchase
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Agreement based upon claims asserted against the Icon Parties because of the Znetix
Advance. See July 2003 Certificate, a copy of which is included in Exhibit 3 to the Brief
of Appellant. (R. 6, 747, 878-879.)
In response to Wells Fargo's motion for summary judgment, the Icon Parties
purported to "partially dispute" material facts numbered 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 12, 16, 17 and 18
stated in Wells Fargo's memorandum and restated above. However, in each case, the
Icon Parties' purported dispute of these facts was merely a statement that a dispute exists
concerning the legal effect of the stated fact. For example, Wells Fargo's statement of
fact number 8 quotes the August 2001 Certificate in which the Icon Parties claim
entitlement to indemnification based on a potential breach of Section 3.10(c)(ii) of the
Asset Purchase Agreement. The Icon Parties purported to "partially dispute" this fact "to
the extent Wells Fargo purports that the Icon Parties are limited to the grounds for
indemnification set out in the August 2001 Officer's Certificate." (R. 916.) Thus, the
Icon Parties did not contest the August 2001 Certificate or the contents of that certificate,
only the legal effect of that certificate. Each of the other "partial disputes" is similar. In
fact, Wells Fargo's material facts numbered 1, 5, 16, 17 and 18 were taken from, and are
nearly identical to, paragraphs 7, 20, 27, 17 and 28 of the Icon Parties' Complaint. None
of the Icon Parties' purported "partial disputes" of fact was effective to create an issue of
material fact.
The additional facts cited by the Icon Parties go to whether Wells Fargo breached
duties owed to the Icon Parties and whether that breach constitutes gross negligence.
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Those facts and issues were not material to the issue of whether the Icon Parties suffered
any damages as a result of Wells Fargo's release of the Escrow Funds, which was the
issue raised in Wells Fargo's Motion for Summary Judgment. Under Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure 7(c) and 56(c), the Icon Parties' failure to dispute the facts prevents the Icon
Parties from nowr relying on appeal on additional facts not presented to the trial court.
See Rule 7(C)(3)(a) ("Each fact set forth in the moving party's memorandum is deemed
admitted for the purpose of summary judgment unless controverted by the responding
party."). The Icon Parties' Statement of the Case in their Appellants' Brief contains facts
not properly presented to the trial court in response to Wells Fargo's summary judgment
motion, and therefore not properly argued on appeal.
V. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court correctly granted Wells Fargo's Motion for Summary Judgment
dismissing the Icon Parties' claims against Wells Fargo. The August 2001 Certificate
was not a valid claim for indemnification under the Asset Purchase Agreement and the
Indemnity Escrow Agreement. Rather, as acknowledged in the August 2001 Certificate,
an indemnifiable claim would have arisen only if there were an actual patent
infringement, i.e., an actual breach of warranty, and the federal court determined that
there was no such infringement. Therefore, the Icon Parties can claim no damages from
Wells Fargo's premature release of the Escrow Funds.
On appeal, the Icon Parties ask this Court to ignore the terms of the written
agreements, and adopt broad warranty of title requirements as the basis for the Icon
xvii

Parties5 indemnification. However, the bases for the Icon Parties' indemnification, and
their claim to the Escrow Funds, are explicitly stated in the Asset Purchase Agreement
and the Indemnity Escrow Agreement. Had the parties desired to expand those bases to
include claims of patent infringement, instead of actual patent infringement, they would
have stated that in the written agreements.
Additionally, because the Icon Parties' July 2003 Certificate was untimely, it did
not create a valid claim for indemnification.
For these reasons, the trial court's decision should be affirmed.
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VI. ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT ICON COULD CLAIM
NO DAMAGES CAUSED BY WELLS FARGO'S RELEASE OF THE
ESCROW FUNDS.
A.

The August 2001 Certificate Was Not a Valid Claim to the Escrow Funds
Because There Was No Patent Infringement and Thus No Breach of
Warranty by Ground Zero.

The trial court correctly held that the Icon Parties have no claim to the Escrow
Funds in connection with the August 2001 Certificate because that certificate was not a
valid claim for indemnification under the Asset Purchase Agreement. Specifically, under
these facts, for a claim to be indemnifiable under the Asset Purchase Agreement, there
must be an actual breach of warranty, i.e., patent infringement, which did not occur in
this case. This actual breach requirement is made clear both by the Asset Purchase
Agreement and the Icon Parties' own Buyer's Certificate, and each is addressed in turn.
1.

The Indemnity Escrow Agreement is Governed by the Asset
Purchase Agreement.

To claim any right to the Escrow Funds, the Icon Parties must establish that they
had a right to indemnification from Ground Zero under the Asset Purchase Agreement.
The Escrow Fund was established "to pay indemnification claims" of the Icon Parties
"pursuant to Article 10 of the Purchase Agreement" and the Indemnity Escrow
Agreement specifically states that "ftjhe basis for claims to indemnification, and any
limitations thereon, shall be governed by the Purchase Agreement, which shall be
controlling between Buyer and Seller for all purposes of this Escrow Agreement. . ."
1

(R. 62-63.)1
2.

The Asset Purchase Agreement Required Actual Infringement For A
Breach Of Warranty.

To establish a right to indemnification under Section 10.2(a)(i) and (ii) of the
Asset Purchase Agreement, there must have been an actual breach of warranty—not

1

The Asset Purchase Agreement contains a list of six specific events giving rise to an
obligation of Ground Zero to indemnify the Icon Parties. The relevant portions are as
follows:
Section 10.2 Indemnification of Buyer by Seller
(a)
Obligation. Seller agrees to indemnify the Buyer and
each of its officers, directors, stockholders, employees, agents, members,
representatives, affiliates, successors and assigns (collectively, the "Buyer
Parties") and hold each of them harmless from and against and pay on
behalf of or reimburse such Buyer Parties in respect of the entirety of any
Losses which the Buyer Parties may suffer, sustain or become subject to, up
to a cumulative maximum amount of $2,400,000 (during the one-year
period following Closing) and thereafter up to a cumulative maximum
amount of $2,000,000, as a result of, arising out of, relating to or in
connection with:
(i)
subject to Section 10.2(b) below, the breach of
any representation or warranty made by the Seller in Article 3 of this
Agreement or in any certificate delivered with respect thereto by the Seller;
(ii)
the breach of any representation, warranty
(other than representations or warranties set forth in Articles 3), covenant or
agreement made by the Seller contained in this Agreement or any of the
other agreements contemplated hereby, any Exhibit or Schedule hereto or
thereto or any certificate delivered by Seller to the Buyer with respect
thereto;

(R. 52-53.)
2

merely a claimed or threatened breach.

Ground Zero's obligation, if any, to indemnify

the Icon Parties in relation to the representation made in Section 3.10(c)(ii) of the Asset
Purchase Agreement is stated in Section 10.2 of the Asset Purchase Agreement in which
Ground Zero agreed to indemnify the Icon Parties for losses "as a result of, arising out of,
relating to or in connection with . . . the breach of any representation or warranty made
by the Seller in Article 3 of this Agreement or in any certificate delivered with respect
thereto by the Seller." (R. 52-53.) In relation to patents, Ground Zero's warranty was
that "[n]o Intellectual Property . . . infringes upon any rights owned or held by any other
Parties." (R. 31.) Ground Zero plainly did not warrant that other parties will not claim
infringement, nor did Ground Zero agree to pay costs incurred by the Icon Parties for
claims or threatened claims of infringement. See e.g., Mermelstein v. Menora, 865
N.E.2d 239, 248 (111. Ct. App. 2007) (clause provided that partnership shall indemnify

2

The Icon Parties contend that "[a]n indemnitee's right to recover fees and costs incurred
in defense is not contingent upon whether the claim indemnified against is ultimately
successful." (Br. of Appellant at 20). However, this argument fails because it ignores the
plain language of the Asset Purchase Agreement which expressly requires a "breach," not
merely a "claimed" or "threatened" breach. See Mautz v. J.P. Patti Co., 688 A.2d 1088,
1091 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1997) ("Indemnity contracts are interpreted in accordance with the
rules governing the construction of contracts generally. . . ."); May Dept. Stores Co. v.
University Hills, Inc., 824 P.2d 100, 101 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991) ("[t]he extent of a
contractual duty to indemnify must be determined from the contract itself. . . . it should
be enforced according to the plain and generally accepted meaning of its language and
interpreted in its entirety to give effect to all of its provisions so none are rendered
meaningless.") (citations omitted). See also id. (ruling that indemnity exclusion clause
applied only where there was actual negligence on the part of May Company, and
finding trial court erred in ruling that the "meritorious nature of a claim is irrelevant to
invocation of the exclusion clause.") (emphasis added).
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and hold harmless for "any judgment, award, settlement, reasonable attorneys' fees and
other costs or expenses incurred "in connection with the defense of any actual or
threatened action, proceeding or claim . . . .") (emphasis added); Bates Fabrics, Inc. v.
LeVeen, 590 A.2d 528, 531 (Me. 1991) (clause in bylaws provided for indemnification
for "[a]ny person who was or is a party or is threatened to be made a party to any
threatened, pending, or completed action . . . . " ) (emphasis added). Further, Ground Zero
did not agree to indemnify if the Icon Parties sought a declaratory judgment of noninfringement. Ground Zero's warranty simply was that the patents did not infringe on
other patents.
3.

The Icon Parties' August 2001 Buyer's Certificate Was Based On
An Alleged Breach Of The Warranty Of Non-Infringement And
Acknowledged That Actual Infringement Was Required.

The Icon Parties' August 2001 Buyer's Certificate was based on an alleged breach
of the warranty of non-infringement and acknowledged that indemnification required an
actual breach of warranty. This language of this certificate is contrary to the
interpretation now urged by the Icon Parties.
As noted above, under the terms of the agreements between the parties, the Icon
Parties' right to claim indemnification from the Escrow Funds arose only if there is a
"breach of any representation or warranty." The relevant warranty relied on by the Icon
Parties was Ground Zero's warranty that no patent sold by Ground Zero to the Icon
Parties infringed on any other patents. Ground Zero did not warrant that other parties
will not claim infringement, nor did Ground Zero agree to pay costs incurred by the Icon
4

Parties if they sought a declaratory judgment of non-infringement. Ground Zero's
warranty simply was the patents did not infringe on other patents.
In the August 2001 Certificate, the Icon Parties claimed entitlement to
indemnification because of an alleged breach of Article 3.10(c)(ii), in which Ground Zero
warranted that "[n]o Intellectual Property . . . infringes upon any rights owned or held by
any other Person." (R. 31.) The Icon Parties allege that this warranty was breached
when Hoist Fitness claimed, by letter, that Ground Zero patents infringed the Hoist
Patent. (R. 817-818.) However, in submitting the August 2001 Certificate, the Icon
Parties acknowledged that under the Asset Purchase Agreement, their claim to
indemnification from the Escrow Funds existed only if there was actual infringement of
the Hoist Patent, stating: "[i]n the event that the Hoist claim of infringement is
successfully prosecuted, such will render the foregoing Seller representation to be
inaccurate and will subject Seller to the indemnification obligation of up to $2,400,000
set forth in paragraph 10.2 of the Asset Purchase Agreement." (R. 817-818) (emphasis
added). Based on this language, the trial court correctly observed that the "certificate
stated a conditional claim based on successful prosecution." (R. 2127 (Tr. at 64:15-16).)
Based on the Icon Parties5 own Buyer's Certificate, the Icon Parties cannot now contend
that successful prosecution by Hoist, i.e., an actual breach, was not required for
indemnification.

5

4.

The Judgment in the Icon Declaratory Judgment Action Established
That Ground Zero Did Not Breach Any Warranty In Connection
With the Hoist Patent.

The judgment obtained by the Icon Parties in the Icon Declaratory Judgment
Action established as a matter of law that Ground Zero did not breach any warranty in
relation to the Hoist Patent, conclusively establishing that there was therefore no
indemnifiable claim.
In the Icon Declaratory Judgment Action filed against Hoist Fitness, the Icon
Parties sought a declaration that the Ground Zero patents held by the Icon Parties did not
infringe on the Hoist Patent (First Claim for Relief) or alternatively, that the Hoist Patent
is invalid (Second Claim for Relief). (R. 820-825.) Hoist counterclaimed alleging that
the Ground Zero patents held by the Icon Parties infringe on the Hoist Patent. (R. 827843.)
In response to cross-motions for summary judgment, the United States District
Court granted summary judgment in favor of the Icon Parties on their First Claim for
Relief and denied Hoist's cross-motion for summary judgment on its counterclaim and
found that "the accused devises of the Free Motion Old Design do not infringe claim 1
(or any claim depending thereform [sic] of the [Hoist] patent) literally or under the
doctrine of equivalents." (R. 845-848, 849-852.)
The federal court order conclusively established that the Ground Zero patents did
not infringe the Hoist Patent. Therefore, that order also conclusively established that
Ground Zero did not breach its warranty of non-infringement as to the Hoist Patent.
6

Thus, the August 2001 Certificate, which was based on an alleged breach of warranty in
relation to the Hoist Patent, did not state any valid claim to indemnification from the
Escrow Funds.
B.

The Icon Parties Cannot Establish Any Damages.

Because the August 2001 Certificate did not represent a valid claim for
indemnification from the Escrow Fund, the Icon Parties cannot show any damages arising
from the allegedly premature release of the Escrow Funds. With no valid claim for
indemnification, Ground Zero would have been entitled to the Escrow Funds as of
December 21, 2001 and no damage to the Icon Parties arose as a result of the allegedly
premature release of the funds on that date. See Colo. Nat'l. Bank v. Friedman, 846 P.2d
159, 174 (Colo. 1993) ("Generally c[d]amages in contract cases attempt to place the
parties in the same financial position they would have occupied had the contract terms
been fulfilled.' Where claims for damages are premised on breaches of contracts,
c

[d]amages that are merely speculative, remote, imaginary or impossible of

ascertainment, cannot be recovered/") {quoting Republic Nat'l. Life Ins. Co. v. Red Lion
Homes, 704 F.2d 484, 488 (10th Cir. 1983) and Boyle v. Bay, 81 Colo. 125, 130, 454
P.2d 156, 158 (1927) and Lee v. Durango Music, 144 Colo. 270, 278, 355 P.2d 1083,
1087(1960).)
Because Ground Zero was entitled to the Escrow Funds absent a timely, valid
claim for indemnification, any damages claimed by the Icon Parties from the release of
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the Escrow Funds to Ground Zero are merely imaginary. The Icon Parties are now in the
same position they would have occupied had the funds been timely released.
C.

The Icon Parties Cannot Expand The Bases For Indemnification Beyond
That Stated In The Written Agreements.

The Icon Parties make several additional arguments. However, these arguments
fail because they do not acknowledge the plain language of the Asset Purchase
Agreement.
1.

The Icon Parties' Reliance on the "Defense of Claims" Paragraph
Fails.

The Icon Parties' reliance on the "Defense of Claims" paragraph in the Asset
Purchase Agreement fails because the Defense of Claims paragraph does not expand the
scope of indemnification under the Asset Purchase Agreement. Rather, the Icon Parties'
selective excerpts from Section 10.4, "Defense of Claims" is not quoted in full and
therefore is not a correct reading of the Asset Purchase Agreement. Section 10.4 states in
full:
Section 10.4 Defense of Claims
If a party hereto seeks indemnification under this Article 10, such
party (the "Indemnified Party") shall give written notice to the other party
(the "Indemnifying Party") after receiving written notice of any action,
lawsuit, proceeding, investigation or other claim against it (if by a third
party) or discovering the liability, obligation or facts giving rise to such
claim for indemnification, describing the claim, the amount thereof (if
known and quantifiable), and the basis thereof; provided that the failure to
so notify the Indemnifying Party shall not relieve the Indemnifying Party of
its or his obligations hereunder except to the extent such failure shall have
prejudiced the Indemnifying Party. In that regard, if any action, lawsuit,
proceeding, investigation or other claim shall be brought or asserted by any
8

third party which, if adversely determined, would entitle the Indemnified
Party to indemnity pursuant to this Article 10, the Indemnified Party shall
promptly notify the Indemnifying Party of the same in writing, specifying
in detail the basis of such claim and the facts pertaining thereto and the
Indemnifying Party shall be entitled to participate in the defense of such
action, lawsuit, proceeding, investigation or other claim giving rise to the
Indemnified Party's claim for indemnification at its expense, and at its
option (subject to the limitations set forth below) shall be entitled to appoint
lead counsel of such defense with reputable counsel reasonably acceptable
to the Indemnified Party; provided that, as a condition precedent to the
Indemnifying Party's right to assume control of such defense, it must first:
(a)
enter into an agreement with the Indemnified Party (in
form and substance reasonably satisfactory to the Indemnified Party)
pursuant to which the Indemnifying Party agrees to be fully responsible for
all Losses relating to such claims and that it will provide full
indemnification to the Indemnified Party for all Losses relating to such
claim; and
(b)
furnish the Indemnified Party with reasonable
evidence lhat the Indemnifying Party is and will be able to satisfy any such
liability; and, provided, further, that the Indemnifying Party shall not have
the right to assume control of such defense and shall pay the fees and
expenses of counsel retained by the Indemnified Party, if the claim which
the Indemnifying Party seeks to assume control (i) seeks non-monetary
relief, (ii) involves criminal or quasi-criminal allegations, (iii) involves a
claim to which the Indemnified Party reasonably believes an adverse
determination would be detrimental to or injure the Indemnified Party's
reputation or future business prospects, or (iv) involves a claim which,
upon petition by the Indemnified Party, the appropriate court rules that the
Indemnifying Party failed or is failing to vigorously prosecute or defend.
If the Indemnifying Party is permitted to assume and control the
defense and elects to do so, the Indemnified Party shall have the right to
employ counsel separate from counsel employed by the Indemnifying Party
in any such action and to participate in the defense thereof, but the fees and
expenses of such counsel employed by the Indemnified Party shall be at the
expense of the Indemnified Party unless (i) the employment thereof has
been specifically authorized by the Indemnifying Party in writing, or (ii) the
Indemnified Party has been advised by legal counsel that a reasonable
likelihood exists of a conflict of interest between the Indemnifying Party
and the Indemnified Party.
9

If the Indemnifying Party shall control the defense of any such
claim, the Indemnifying Party shall obtain the prior written consent of the
Indemnified Party (which shall not be unreasonably withheld) before
entering into any settlement of a claim or ceasing to defend such claim, if
(i) pursuant to or as a result of such settlement or cessation, injunction or
other equitable relief will be imposed against the Indemnified Party, (ii) if
such settlement does not expressly unconditionally release the Indemnified
Party from all liabilities and obligations with respect to such claim, without
prejudice or (iii) such settlement would have an adverse impact on the
liability of the Seller for Taxes for any taxable period (or portion thereof)
beginning after the Closing Date.
(R. 54-55 (emphasis added).)
The Icon Parties' argument requires the Court to interpret Section 10.4 of the
Asset Purchase Agreement as requiring the Indemnifying Party to defend claims. In fact,
Section 10.4 does not so require. Rather, Section 10.4 merely gives to the Indemnifying
Party the right, but not the obligation, to defend claims that may lead to a future
obligation to indemnify. Section 10.4 provides that "[i]f a party hereto seeks
indemnification under Article 10, such party (the "Indemnified Party") shall give written
notice to the other party (the "Indemnifying P a r t y " ) . . . " (R. 54-55.) The Asset
Purchase Agreement then states: "In that regard, if any action, lawsuit, proceeding,
investigation or other claim shall be brought or asserted by any third party which, //
adversely determined, would entitle the Indemnified Party to indemnity pursuant to
Article 10, ... the Indemnifying Party shall be entitled to participate in the defense of
such action, lawsuit, proceeding, investigation or claim ... at its expense, and at its option
(subject to the limitations set forth below) shall be entitled to appoint lead counsel of
such defense ..." {See id.) (emphasis added). Thus, the Indemnifying Party is given the
10

right, but not the obligation to defend claims that "if adversely determined" would create
an indemnification obligation. This is consistent with the August 2001 Certificate
submitted by the Icon Parties, in which the Icon Parties expressly acknowledged that the
Hoist threatened claim would give rise to a claim for indemnification only if Hoist
established that there was infringement.
This right to assume control of the defense is also expressly conditioned on the
Indemnifying Party agreeing in writing that it will indeed indemnify the other party for
all Losses that arise from the claim. {Id.)
The portion of Section 10.4 quoted by the Icon Parties denies the Indemnifying
Party the right to assume the defense of claims in certain circumstances, but does not
create new obligations to indemnify. Specifically, the portion quoted by the Icon Parties
states that "the Indemnifying party shall not have the right to assume control of such
defense and shall pay the fees and expenses of counsel retained by the Indemnified Party,
if the claim which the Indemnifying Party seeks to assume control" falls into one of the
four categories thereafter described. (Id.)
Thus, the clear reading of the Asset Purchase Agreement as a whole is that Section
10.4 grants to Ground Zero a right, but not an obligation, to defend at its expense claims
that may, if adversely determined, create an obligation to indemnify. In the defined cases
in which the right to defend is not given to the Indemnifying Party, the Asset Purchase
Agreement merely recognized that the Indemnifying Party will pay the attorneys' fees
incurred by the Indemnified Party, but that obligation can only arise if the claim results in
11

an indemnifiable event under the agreement. To read the Asset Purchase Agreement
otherwise is to create, out of a single clause, an obligation to pay attorneys' fees for
defense of claims that do not amount to an indemnifiable event under Section 10.2 and
which is inconsistent with the precise allocation of obligations under both Sections 10.2
and 10.4 of the Asset Purchase Agreement. Had the parties agreed that Ground Zero
would be liable for attorneys' fees for defense of a claimed infringement, Section
10.3(a)(ii) of the Asset Purchase Agreement would state that an obligation to indemnify
arises out of a claimed breach of any representation in Article 3. However, Section
10.3(a)(ii) states that an obligation to indemnify arises out of an actual "breach of any
representation or warranty made by Seller in Article 3." (R. 52-53.)
2.

"Losses" Are Indemnifiable Only if There Was a Breach of
Warranty.

The Icon Parties' reference to the broad definition of "Losses" in the Asset
Purchase Agreement is also unavailing. "Losses" are recoverable only if they are "a
result of, arising out of, or in connection with [ ] . . . the breach of any representation or
warranty."4 (R. 52-53.) As explained above, Ground Zero's warranty in relation to

3

The Icon Parties focus on the language "as a result of, arising out of, or relating to or in
connection with . . . . " to argue that such phrases should be interpreted broadly (Br. of
Appellant at 30.) However, in so doing, the Icon Parties ignore the critical subsequent
language which specifically requires a "breach."
4
The Icon Parties argue that "a breach of the warranty occurs whenever an adverse claim
arises, without regard to whether the claim ultimately is successful." (Br. of Appellant at
22.) However, the warranty of title cases relied on by the Icon Parties are not helpful
because only one of the cases relied on involved a written agreement to indemnify. In
Catlin Aviation Co. v. Equilease Corp., 626 P.2d 857 (Okla. 1981), cited by the Icon
12

patents, and relied on by the Icon Parties in making claim to the Escrow Funds (that the
Intellectual Property does not infringe others' rights), was not breached - as evidenced by
the Judgment in the Declaratory Judgment Action.5 (R. 750-752.)
3.

Other Provisions Of The Asset Purchase Agreement Demonstrate
That There Is A Distinction Between A "Breach" And A "Claim."

Moreover, the Icon Parties' argument that the indemnity clause somehow covered
a "claim" of breach, rather than only an actual breach, is defeated by reference to other
provisions of the Asset Purchase Agreement. The Asset Purchase Agreement clearly
delineates between an actual breach and a claim, because it uses both terms in the same
section. Specifically, while Sections 10.2(a)(i) and (ii) use the term "breach," Section
10.2(a)(iii) uses the term "claims," providing indemnification for "any claims of any
brokers or finders claiming by, through or under the Seller with respect to the

Parties, the seller of an airplane agreed in writing "to hold you harmless to any claims in
the event any suit is instituted with respect to any claim which will challenge the legality
of our title . . ." Id. at 858. Thus, in Catlin the seller expressly agreed to hold the buyer
harmless if a suit was instituted challenging title. By contrast, the detailed, sophisticated
agreement entered into by the Icon Parties and Ground Zero merely provided that Ground
Zero indemnified if there is a breach of the warranty of non-infringement. Had the
parties intended, the Icon Parties could easily have required the agreement to provide that
Ground Zero will indemnify if a suit is instituted alleging an infringement. The Asset
Purchase Agreement does not so provide.
5

The Icon Parties cite Collier v. Heinz, 827 P.2d 982 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) for the
proposition that "[u]nder Utah law, attorneys' fees are recoverable where 'the defendant's
breach of contract foreseeably caused the plaintiff to incur attorney fees through
litigation with a third party.'" (Br. of Appellant at 22-23) (emphasis added). However,
Collier is not instructive because in the present case, there was no breach of contract by
Wells Fargo that caused the Icon Parties to incur fees by initiating a declaratory judgment
action against Hoist.
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transactions contemplated hereby." (R. 52-53) (emphasis added). By using the terms
"breach" and "claims" in the same section, but in different contexts, the Asset Purchase
Agreement clearly contemplates a difference between an actual and a mere claimed
breach. See Mitchell v. Prime Commercial, Inc., 1999 Utah App. LEXIS 269 *4 (Dec.
30, 1999) (noting "[t]he fact that different language was used in the two paragraphs [of
the same contract] underscores the argument that the paragraphs were likely intended to
have different meanings.")
4.

Section 10.2fiv) Does Not Apply.

Additionally, the Icon Parties cite Section 10.2(a)(iv) for the proposition that
indemnification is required for "any facts, events, circumstances, conditions or status
arising or existing prior to the Closing . . . and relating to the Seller." (Br. of Appellant at
37.) However, this argument fails because of the well-established rule of construction
that a specific provision, i.e., Section 10.2(a)(i) and (ii), which deal specifically with
breach of warranty, governs over a general provision, i.e., Section 10.2(a)(iv), which
generally refers to "facts, events, circumstances, conditions or status . . . ." The specific
warranty relied on by Icon in relation to patents is a warranty by Ground Zero that no
intellectual property infringes on rights of others. (R. 31.) This specific warranty as to
intellectual property, which was not breached, controls over more general warranties.
See Swenson v. Erickson, 998 P.2d 807, 812 (Utah 2000) ("[i]t is not this court's practice
to override specific language with general provisions dealing with wholly distinct subject
matter. Under the well-established rule of construction ejusdem generis, general
14

language must be confined to its meaning by specific enumeration which proceeds [sic]
it, unless a contrary intention is shown.") Thus, the Icon Parties cannot ignore the
specific language of Section 10.2(a)(i) and rely on the catch-all language of Section
10.2(a)(iv).
5.

The Icon Parties' Cases Are Distinguishable Because They Apply
Only To Indemnifiable Claims, And The Present Claim Is Not
Indemnifiable.

The Icon Parties cite several other cases to support their position. However,
reliance on these cases is misplaced because, unlike the present case, the Icon Parties'
cases involve recovery of attorney fees and costs incurred only in defending an
indemnified claim. (Br. of Appellant at 19-21.) As explained above, because the Icon
Parties' claim is not an "indemnified claim," the cases are not instructive.
For example, the Icon Parties rely heavily on the case of Peter Fabrics v. S.S.
"Hermes, " 765 F.2d 306 (2 nd Cir. 1985). However, this case is not helpful to the Icon
Parties because in Peter Fabrics, the Court found only that "an indemnitee may recover
from his indemnitor attorneys' fees and expenses incurred in defending a claim as to
which he is indemnified

. . . ." Id. at 315 (emphasis added). Because the present claim is

not one "as to which [the Icon Parties are] indemnified," Peter Fabrics is inapplicable. 6

6

In Peter Fabrics, the indemnification clause specifically permitted indemnification for
mere claims, stating that "[Italian Line] will defend, indemnify and hold harmless
[Massport] from and against all claims, causes of action, suits, losses, damages, liabilities
and expenses . . . ." 765 F.2d at 313. Similarly, in Jones v. Strom Constr. Co., Inc., 527
P.2d 1115, 1118 (Wash. 1974), the indemnification clause specifically covered "claims."
By contrast, in the present case, the indemnification language is markedly different,
15

Other cases cited by the Icon Parties are inapplicable for the same reasons. See
Piedmont Equip. Co. v. Eberhard Manufacturing Co., 665 P.2d 256, 258 (Nev. 1983)
(discussing attorneys' fees and costs relating to situations in which a party was
"otherwise entitled to indemnity") (emphasis added); Duty Free Shoppers Group, Ltd. v.
State, 111 P.2d 649, 654(Alaska 1989) (affirming award of costs and attorney's fees in
case where state was entitled to indemnity).
Moreover, the case of Flunker v. United States, 528 F.2d 239 (9th Cir. 1975), {see
Br. of Appellant at 19-20), does not support the Icon Parties' argument because in that
case, the Court actually found that "the predicate for indemnity [was] breach of the
implied warranty of workmanlike service," 528 F.2d at 245 (emphasis added), not a mere
claim of a breach that ultimately proved unsuccessful, and in Flunker, the court found
that the relevant warranty was, in fact, breached.
The Icon Parties also cite the Utah cases of James Constructors, Inc. v. Salt Lake
City Corp, 888 P.2d 665, 673 (Utah Ct. App. 1974) and Pavoni v. Nielsen, 999 P.2d 595
(Utah Ct. App. 2000), for the proposition that "[t]he Utah Court of Appeals has cited with
approval the Peter Fabrics case, and has further described the rule that an indemnitee
may recover the attorneys' fees and costs incurred in defending an indemnified claim as

stating that the "Seller agrees to indemnify the Buyer . . . and hold each of them harmless
from and against... in respect of the entirety of any Losses which the Buyer Parties may
suffer, sustain or become subject to . . . .as a result of, arising out of, relating to or in
connection with . . . the breach of any representation or warranty made by the Seller in
Article 3 of this Agreement. . . ." (R. 52-53.) There is no reference to indemnification
for claimed breaches of warranty.
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the 'virtually unanimous rule.'" (Br. of Appellant at 20.) However, this assertion is
problematic for the Icon Parties in two respects. First, both James Constructors and
Pavoni described the recovery of attorneys' fees and costs incurred in "defending an
indemnified claim." James Constructors, 888 P.2d at 673; Pavoni, 999 P.2d at 599
(Emphasis added). In the present case, the Icon Parties brought their own declaratory
judgment action rather than "defending" against a claim by Hoist. Additionally, as noted
above, the claim in the present case was not an "indemnified claim" because the Asset
Purchase Agreement did not permit indemnification under these circumstances. Second,
both James Constructors and Pavoni actually reinforce Wells Fargo's argument that the
express terms of the Asset Purchase Agreement govern. In James Constructors, the
Court did not rely on general principles of case law in determining the right to indemnity,
but rather looked to the express provisions of the agreement, stating "we look to that
document. . . [which] expressly charges [the indemnitor] with any attorney fees [the
indemnitee] might incur in enforcing the right of indemnification." Id. at 674 (emphasis
added). Likewise, in Pavoni, the Court noted that "the indemnity agreement specifically
refers to attorney fees arising from enforcement of the indemnity agreement," and in fact
the indemnification clause provided for recovery of attorneys fees incurred "by reason of
any asserted breach." 999 P.2d at 597. As argued above, in the present case, the express
terms of the Asset Purchase Agreement did not provide indemnification for a mere claim
of patent infringement, but rather only for actual infringement. Because James
Constructors and Pavoni both looked to the express language of the indemnification
17

agreement, they are not helpful to the Icon Parties' position.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT THE JULY 2003
CERTIFICATE WAS UNTIMELY.
A.

The July 2003 Certificate Was Untimely.

In July 2003, some 19 months after the escrow terminated, the Icon Parties
submitted a second certificate (the July 2003 Certificate). However, the July 2003
Certificate was untimely and the trial court correctly held that the Icon Parties cannot
state a claim against Wells Fargo based on that certificate.
1.

The Escrow Terminated in December 2001.

By its terms, the escrow terminated in December 2001. Paragraph 8 of the
Indemnity Escrow Agreement states:
8.
Termination. This Agreement shall terminate (a) on the date
on which there are no funds remaining in the Escrow Fund, or (b) by
mutual consent signed by all parties.
(R. 65.)
No funds remained in the Escrow Fund after December 2001 and thus the escrow
terminated as of that date.

7

The Icon Parties also cite Hanover Ltd. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 758 P.2d 443 (Utah Ct.
App. 1988) for the proposition that the right to indemnity is not contingent on the
outcome of the claim. (Br. of Appellant at 21.) However, unlike the present case which
involves an express agreement regarding indemnity, in Hanover there was no such
express agreement, but rather indemnification was based on a theory of implied
indemnity in a products liability case. 758 P.2d at 445 ("[t]here is no express indemnity
contract between Trans West and Cessna . . . . Consequently, Trans West is entitled to be
indemnified, if at all, under the equitable concept of implied indemnity.").
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The Icon Parties argue that Wells Fargo may not rely on the December 2001
release of funds 1o terminate the escrow because that release was in breach of the terms of
the Indemnity Escrow Agreement. This argument fails for two reasons. First, as
explained above, the August 2001 Certificate, on which the Icon Parties base their
argument that Wells Fargo's release of the funds was premature, was not a valid claim for
indemnification. Absent that claim, the Escrow Funds were to be released in December
2001. The Icon Parties cannot claim benefit from an alleged breach by Wells Fargo when
that breach relates solely to an invalid claim for indemnification submitted by the Icon
Parties. Second, by definition, no escrow can exist without funds in escrow. Whether or
not the agreement so provides, when no funds are held in escrow, the escrow has
terminated.
2.

There Was No Basis For Holding The Funds After February 2003.

The clear intent of the Indemnity Escrow Agreement was to preserve the Escrow
Fund for one year - to December 21, 2001, unless a claim was made. (R. 790-791, 794.)
The Icon Parties made a claim to the Escrow Fund in August 2001, but that claim was not
a valid claim for indemnification from the Escrow Fund. (R. 749-752.) The Icon Parties
now want the Court to say that, because of this invalid claim to Escrow Funds, they
should be entitled to assert a second claim to the Escrow Fund, more than two and onehalf years after the Escrow Fund was to be released to Ground Zero, absent a valid claim
(and months after the claim was proved to be invalid by the Judgment in the Declaratory
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Judgment Action). This argument is contrary to the terms and clear intent of the written
agreements.
The February 10, 2003 Order by the United States District Court conclusively
established that the August 2001 Certificate did not represent a valid claim for
indemnification. Absent a valid claim for indemnification, the Escrow Funds were to be
released in December 2001. Thus, as of February 10, 2003, the Icon Parties had no valid
basis for claiming that Wells Fargo should have been holding any Escrow Funds.
Therefore, the July 2003 Certificate was untimely and ineffective to make any claim
under the Indemnity Escrow Agreement.
VII. CONCLUSION
The trial court correctly granted Wells Fargo's Motion for Summary Judgment.
On the undisputed facts presented to the trial court, no damages can be claimed by the
Icon Parties due to the release of the Escrowed Funds to Ground Zero because under the
parties5 agreement, the Icon Parties' claim to the money failed. Accordingly, Wells
Fargo respectfully requests that the Court affirm the decision of the trial court dismissing
the Icon Parties'claims.
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